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Abstract: This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate 
account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses 
cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John 
McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising 
alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back 
to Russellian considerations that contaminated the interpretation of Frege. This contaminated 
understanding is first detected in Tyler Burge’s distinction between de dicto and de re, then connected 
to the motivations behind David Kaplan’s notion of character, and finally found in John Searle’s 
descriptivist account. The difficulty in understanding de re thoughts is, roughly speaking, a side effect 
of the misunderstanding of the boundaries separating internal and external elements of thoughts, as 
well as the distinction between mental content and means of representation.       
Keywords: De re thought. Gottlob Frege. Gareth Evans. John McDowell. 
PENSAMENTOS DE RE FREGEANOS 
Resumo: Nesse artigo, pretende-se esclarecer alguns equívocos que parecem impedir uma 
compreensão adequada de pensamentos de re no interior do quadro teórico fregeano. É 
normalmente pressuposto que os sentidos fregeanos não podem ser de re, ou dependentes de 
objetos. Contra essa pressuposição, Gareth Evans e John McDowell defenderam que sentidos de re 
fregeanos são não apenas possíveis, mas constituem de fato a alternativa mais promissora para 
compreender pensamentos de re.  As razões que parecem bloquear essa alternativa remontam a 
considerações russellianas que contaminaram a interpretação de Frege. Essa compreensão 
contaminada é primeiramente detectada na distinção de Tyler Burge entre de dicto e de re, em 
seguida ela é conectada às motivações subjacentes à noção de caráter, de David Kaplan, e por fim 
ela é encontrada na abordagem descritivista de John Searle. A dificuldade de compreender 
pensamentos de re é, grosso modo, um efeito colateral da incompreensão das fronteiras que 
separam os elementos internos e externos do pensamento, bem como da distinção entre conteúdo 
mental e formas de representação. 
Palavras-Chave: Pensamento de re. Gottlob Frege. Gareth Evans. John McDowell. 
 
 
*   *   * 
 
 
Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves 
COGNITIO-ESTUDOS: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia, ISSN 1809-8428, São Paulo: CEP/PUC-SP, vol. 11, nº. 1, janeiro-junho, 2014, p. 1-12 
 2
I 
 De re thoughts, or thoughts dependent upon objects, bring with them various 
semantic, epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological complications that can 
hardly be harmonized into a general theory of mind and language. But, at the same 
time, sound reasons seem to make their acceptance mandatory. It is, therefore, the 
theoretician’s job to find a satisfactory account of them. 
 This is a modest paper. No novel complicated theory is advanced, nor do I 
attempt to solve any of the long-standing dilemmas called forth by the very notion of 
de re thoughts. Instead, this paper aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that 
seem to block an adequate understanding of this notion.   
 Why is it difficult to accommodate de re thoughts? Are these difficulties 
legitimate, or are they only side effects of some conceptual confusion? In order to 
bring these questions into consideration, I propose a preliminary inquiry into the path 
taken by the most influential interpretations of Gottlob Frege. These interpretations, 
or so I claim, were strongly influenced by some points raised by Bertrand Russell that 
guided the classical readings of Frege and the very understanding of central issues 
in philosophy of mind and language. Broadly speaking, the diagnosis offered here 
highlights a contamination of the understanding of mental phenomena with 
illegitimate epistemological issues. There is, in these contaminated understandings, 
an apparent contradiction between epistemological impositions and the Fregean 
view. This apparent conflict, in turn, motivated most of the difficulties concerning the 
proper understanding of de re thoughts.  
 According to a widespread interpretation of Frege, de re thoughts are 
problematic. A proposition, or a thought, can only refer to an object if a specific 
content can be provided by specifications that would count as the sense of that 
linguistic expression. Independently of the way in which such determinations or 
specifications are understood, the main point is that the content of a thought, or a 
proposition, must be capable of being expressed independently of the object’s 
existence.  
 Contrary to orthodoxy, Evans (1982) claimed that this interpretation is, if not 
mistaken, at least extremely hasty. We can, he claims, account for singular terms, 
within the Fregean framework, in terms of de re senses. Following some remarks in 
the same spirit made by McDowell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), this paper unfolds what 
seems to block the interpretation of Frege advocated by Gareth Evans and John 
McDowell. The apparent impossibility of this interpretation, I claim, is symptomatic of 
something deep that goes down to the roots of the difficulties in accommodating de 
re thoughts.  
 This paper is structured in the following way: I initially (II) present the 
distinction between de dicto and de re, as it is conceived by Burge (1977), and 
sketch a way of making it compatible with the Fregean framework; I then (III) 
highlight an ambiguity in Burge’s view, following McDowell’s (1998a) remarks; 
Subsequently (IV), the central question is made more precise, as concerning the 
reasons that explain the misunderstandings of Frege; then (V) I investigate if 
Kaplan’s (1979) notion of character can be seen as an analogue of de re senses, and 
conclude that it cannot; I later (VI) identify Burge’s main reason for understanding de 
re thoughts in the way he does in the rejection of Searle’s (1983) approach; I then 
(VII) argue that Searle falls prey to the same confusion and does not offer a 
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satisfactory Fregean alternative; I finally (VIII) conclude the paper with general 
conclusive remarks concerning the roots of the problem in Russell’s epistemological 
commitments. If any illumination on the notion of de re thoughts, as it can be 
understood in Fregean terms, can be reached here, my aims are fulfilled.  
 
II 
The inclusion of de re senses in the Fregean framework is apparently blocked 
by a certain conception of the distinction between de re and de dicto. This conception 
is well illustrated by Burge’s (1977) account. According to Tyler Burge, if we focus on 
the logical form, or on the semantic level, we may say that a de dicto thought relates 
a subject to a full proposition, or to a completely expressed proposition, while a de re 
thought connects a subject to a res, which is something less than a full proposition. 
On the other hand, epistemologically speaking, we may say that a de dicto belief is 
fully conceptualized, while a de re belief situates the believer in a non-conceptual or 
contextual relation to the object of belief. According to Burge, if a propositional 
attitude is de re, a context involving the res itself must take part in the determination 
of this attitude.  
Given the conception sketched above, the crucial question is what supposedly 
blocks the Fregean view from accepting de re thoughts. A handful of intriguing 
passages in Frege’s corpus seem to clearly accept such possibility. I quote one of 
them:  
If a time indication is conveyed by the present tense, one must know 
when the sentence was uttered in order to grasp the thought 
correctly. Therefore the time of utterance is part of the expression of 
the thought. […]. In all such cases [expressions like ‘yesterday’, 
‘today’, ‘here’ and ‘there’] the mere wording, as it can be preserved in 
writing, is not the complete expression of the thought; the knowledge 
of certain conditions accompanying the utterance, which are used as 
means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the 
thought correctly. (FREGE, 1977, p. 10). 
Frege refers here to thoughts that are not fully expressed by words, 
independently of any context. However, Frege does not mention thoughts that are 
not fully expressed simpliciter. We can conceive the set of fully expressed de re 
thoughts, which are, nonetheless, dependent upon objects. In other words, being de 
re does not mean being partially indeterminate. Nothing in Frege’s thinking blocks the 
possibility of contexts contributing for the expression of fully expressed de re 
thoughts.  
 Many readers of Frege, however, see impossibility here. Consider the 
following example: someone who says ‘yesterday’ may express, through this 
expression, the same she does by saying ‘today’ in the next day. However, according 
to Frege, thoughts are composed of senses. What seems to be a single thought 
expressed in different ways could not, they claim, be a Fregean thought, but only a 
Russellian proposition, which can contain the object itself (the day referred in the 
example) as part of it. 
 Interpreting Frege so as to make his thought similar to Russellian propositions 
seems to be a sheer aberration. His thought would, in this way, become identical to 
Russell’s, and Frege would have certainly noticed and stressed that. But it didn’t 
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happen. As a matter of fact, Frege (1979, p. 187) is fairly explicit on that matter: “… 
we can’t say that an object is part of a thought as a proper name is part of the 
corresponding sentence”. Moreover, the distinction between sense and reference 
(Bedeutung) would become useless, since its main motivation is explaining the 
diverse cognitive values of co-referring expressions, and to do its job the distinction 
cannot admit the substitution of co-extensional terms salva veritate. Introducing 
objects in thoughts would deny any relevant role to senses (or modes of 
presentation), and it would turn mysterious the existing cognitive differences between 
co-referring expressions. 
 Such enigmatic paradoxes springing from Frege’s view led Gareth Evans to 
search for alternative routes. Expressions like ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’, claimed Evans, 
keep track of the same object, allowing us to express the very same thought through 
different expressions. These terms act, according to Evans (1982), as dynamic 
thoughts. They are not like Russellian propositions, since not every co-referential 
expression does the same job. They have specific senses or modes of presentation, 
but senses that are dynamic. This should not be confused with a mere identification 
of sense and object. Senses keep playing their role of explaining cognitive 
differences. Understanding a dynamic expression means grasping the dynamic 
character of its mode of presentation. Ignoring its way of keeping track of the referent 
(Bedeutung) means loosing any touch with the thought supposedly expressed. 
 
III 
 A fine-grained analysis of Burge’s conception shows why he does not consider 
an interpretation of Frege along the lines proposed by Evans. There is an epistemic 
contamination in Burge’s view that affects the semantic distinction between de dicto 
and de re. The notion of concept is regarded as the epistemic analogue of what is 
expressed in a meaningful expression. According to Burge (1977, p. 345), 
“traditionally speaking, concepts are a person’s means of representing objects in 
thought”. In this sense, perceptions or images can also be regarded as concepts, 
understood as means of representing objects. Semantically speaking, a belief is de 
dicto if it connects the believer to a fully expressed proposition. Epistemically 
speaking, one has a de dicto attitude if the belief is fully conceptualized. The content 
of a de dicto belief, according to Burge, is composed of semantic elements present in 
the believer’s conceptual repertoire. 
 Since conceptual content is composed of means of representation in thought, 
a fully conceptualized belief is such that its propositional content must be exhausted 
by elements that are cognitively accessible to the believer’s conceptual repertoire. 
According to this view, there is no place for the contribution of contextual elements. 
The attribution of fully expressed beliefs, or completely determined beliefs, does not 
admit de re elements. 
 According to McDowell (1998a, p. 218), Burge makes an illegitimate move 
when he shifts “[…] from concepts as parts or aspects of the content of a 
representational state, such as a belief, to concepts as means of representation”. In 
the first sense, a concept is whatever is expressed through words; while in the 
second, concepts are what express, or they are the expressions or words 
themselves. 
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 The ambiguity in the use of the notion of concept does not come without 
unwanted consequences. One of them is the untenable image of the relation 
between context and content. If properly understood, contextual elements do not 
have to be external to the capacities of determining content of a particular conceptual 
repertoire. Likewise, what is expressed by a statement that is responsive to the 
context does not have to be regarded as partially indeterminate, nor do we have to 
interpret Frege as saying anything along these lines. 
 McDowell summarized the point in the following way: 
[…] a conceptual repertoire can include the ability to think of objects 
under modes of presentation whose functioning depends essentially 
on (say) the perceived presence of the objects. Such de re modes of 
presentation would be parts or aspects of content, not vehicles for it; 
no means of mental representation could determine the content in 
question by itself, without benefit of context, but that does not 
establish any good sense in which the content is not fully 
conceptualized. (MCDOWELL, 1998a, p. 219) 
 
IV 
 The problem can now be made more precise. The main confusion concerns 
the distinction between mental content and means of representation. A conflation of 
that distinction, which is manifest in Burge’s view, explains why most interpreters of 
Frege took the wrong track.  
It is usually assumed that Fregean senses (which include senses of singular 
terms) must be expressible even in the absence of the determined object. Part of the 
explanation of this assumption is linked to the fact that Frege was read under 
Russellian lights. If we read Frege with the puzzle of empty proper names in mind, 
we tend to interpret his distinction of sense and reference (Bedeutung) as an 
analogue of Russell’s theory of descriptions. However, this puzzle is not central to 
Frege, and it did not play any important role in motivating his distinction between 
sense and reference.  
A great virtue of Burge’s (1977) account is that it does not simply take the 
widely assumed conception for granted, but it tries to justify it. Burge brings to light 
the main premises supporting the standard interpretation, which can be summed up 
in two very plausible principles: (1) beliefs that are dependent upon objects can only 
exist if contextual elements play an essential role in determining thought; (2) context 
and content must be separated.  
These principles were blindly assumed by former interpretations of Frege. 
Burge has the merit of making them explicit. When seen in clear light, the second 
premise supporting the standard view reveals an illegitimate distinction between 
context and content. The apparent impossibility of introducing de re elements in 
Fregean thoughts, I conclude, springs from that confusion.  
 The confusion pointed above is certainly not completely unmotivated. When 
investigated more closely, Fregean thoughts seem to shelter inconsistencies. It looks 
as if this notion is in need of urgent additions or improvements. What, after all, have 
led so many to misunderstandings? We walk here along a blurred line that separates 
mere verbal issues (how certain terms are used) from substantial philosophical 
questions. The exegetical aspect (what Frege had in mind) is, to my purposes here, 
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of secondary interest. The central question is why Frege was interpreted the way he 
was. Whatever blocked an interpretation along Evans’ and McDowell’s lines, it 
matters not for the sake of exegetical purity, but, above all, because it harbors a 
substantial philosophical problem concerning how de re elements can be understood. 
 
V 
 One of the reasons that can be advanced against the possibility of de re 
thoughts in Frege is the difficulty of accommodating an adequate notion of constant 
linguistic meaning for expressions that are responsive to context. One way of 
meeting this challenge is by attributing a constant mode of presentation to context 
sensitive expressions. According to this view, a single mode of presentation can have 
different uses. According to the standard view, this mode of presentation could not 
possibly be a Fregean sense, since it could not determine a referent (Bedeutung) 
without the help of context. This supposedly non-Fregean mode of presentation can 
be seen as a character, as it was conceived by Kaplan (1979), which is a function 
linking contexts to Russellian propositions or their parts.  
 There are some structural similarities between Kaplan and Burge. Kaplan’s 
character maps the relation between content and context, but context and content 
are clearly separated, as Burge demands. In this sense, Kaplan seems to offer an 
alternative to the Fregean de re sense account, and an alternative that meets 
Burge’s requirements. I investigate now if Kaplan’s suggestion can be combined to 
our new understanding of Frege and if it counts as a satisfactory account of de re 
thoughts. 
 The first pressing question is if the Fregean framework is really in need of any 
substantive addition or transformation. The constant aspect of linguistic meaning, or 
so I argue, can be perfectly accommodated if one accepts Fregean de re senses. I 
sketch now a way of doing so, inspired mainly by McDowell’s (1998c) proposal. 
Particular de re senses, each one designating its own res, can be arranged in 
types. Different de re senses, or distinct modes of presentation, can present their re 
in the same way. Let us consider, for instance, modes of presentation dependent on 
some form of perceptual presence of the object. The constancy, or what is common 
to every use of the same context sensitive expression, is relative to a type of de re 
sense. 
 The distinction between the former strategy for accommodating the constancy 
of linguistic meaning (through the notion of character) and the latter (that 
differentiates types of de re senses) should not be obliterated. Roughly speaking, the 
first strategy goes as follows: given a particular context, the appropriate sub-
sentential character determines an object, if it is cognitively graspable in the context; 
otherwise, it determines nothing. Even if there is no object, a character can still be 
expressed, since it is just a constituent of sub-propositional conceptual content. Now 
the second strategy: given a particular context, a type of de re sense can either 
determine a particular de re sense or not determine anything at all. In the case of not 
determining anything, there is emptiness, or absence (say), somewhere in the mind. 
In this empty slot, depending on the type of de re sense that is apparently 
instantiated, it is expected a specific de re sense, that in fact fails to be instantiated.  
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 The first strategy stretches the notion of de re thought in direction of some kind 
of Russellian proposition, which would be composed of both res and character. The 
pair res-character would play the role of a de re sense (i.e., to determine a 
Bedeutung). This determination would depend upon the object (res) in order to 
succeed, and the appropriate Bedeutung would be the res itself. This suggestion 
may, prima facie, look adequate and even compatible with Frege. But here 
appearances are misleading. In fact, according to this view, thoughts become de re, 
but the Fregean doctrine that thoughts are made up of senses, and not of 
Bedeutungen, is violated. This strategy is a way of abandoning Frege and moving 
closer to a Russellian position that introduces worldly objects directly in the content of 
thoughts. In this sense, Kaplan and Burge share the view that an adequate 
understanding of de re thoughts asks for the abandonment of the Fregean view. 
 
VI 
 According to McDowell (1998c), Burge’s illegitimate move (that of conflating 
vehicle and content of thoughts) finds support on the weaknesses of the only 
admitted alternative. According to Burge (1977), there seems to be only two 
alternatives: the abandonment of the Fregean view, that he advocates, or some 
version of the perspective adopted by John Searle (1983).  
Burge (197) claims that the only way in which Frege can deal with context 
sensitive singular terms is by attributing senses that determine their objects 
independently of the object’s existence. This view, he claims, would be a kind of 
representational realism that defends that experience presents things “before the 
mind”, whether or not the perceived objects actually exist. Even when an object is in 
fact perceived, one must say that it is “before the mind” only by proxy. The result is 
an indirect relation between demonstrative thought and object. Searle (1983, p. 218) 
explicitly defends this position. He claims that demonstrative thoughts, just like the 
ones that we have, could be thought even by a brain in a vat. According to Searle, 
causal relations determine the object of a perceptual demonstrative thought. The 
objects we think about are in the mind, it follows, only by proxy. 
 Searle’s view is straightforwardly rejected by Burge (1977). This rejection 
explains the compulsory aspect that Burge sees in rejecting the Fregean view. 
However, the alternative presented by Burge faces equally difficult challenges. 
According to Burge (1977), the content of a belief is partially determined by 
something outside the believer’s cognitive world, or by something external to the 
cognitive capacities of her mind. This strange consequence is tolerated because the 
rival position is considered to be even worse. The other alternative, namely Searle’s 
view, would turn de re contents, which are determined both by elements from one’s 
cognitive repertoire and by elements external to the thinker, into elements that are in 
the mind, as opposed to something that is in the world. Indeed, Searle’s position is 
untenable, since it completely divorces the mind from the world. In this view, there is 
no genuine objective content, and whatever is called de re would be in fact strangely 
mental, and just mental. 
 Oscillations between unsatisfactory positions are very common in philosophy. 
Situations like that invite us to investigate shared suspect assumptions. Hence the 
insistence of McDowell in bringing a new interpretation of Frege to the stage. The 
point here goes much beyond mere exegetical justice. We may find here a hidden 
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alternative capable of solving long-debated puzzles. Re-interpreting Frege is then a 
truly philosophical strategy, aiming at solving specific problems. Introducing Fregean 
de re senses may be a way of satisfying all of Burge’s own desiderata without the 
price of making pieces of our thoughts somehow external to our cognitive capacities. 
The main idea here, that of making de re senses possible, is that we can entertain 
thoughts that are both de re and that belong to the thinker’s cognitive universe. 
 
VII 
 Searle (1983, p. 197) claims that the kind of relation between mind and 
particular objects that he defends is “Fregean in spirit”. According to Searle, Fregean 
senses determine their corresponding referents (Bedeutungen) through a set of 
specifications that pick out the right object. In other words: a Fregean sense is an 
analogue of a Russellian definite description. According to Searle, by introducing the 
distinction between sense and reference (Bedeutung), Frege anticipated Russell’s 
theory of descriptions. Following this interpretation, a sense is something that can be 
thought or expressed independently of the object’s existence. 
 This “descriptivist” approach advocated by Searle was classically criticized by 
Kripke (1980). The notion of rigid designation pointed to the fact that a description, or 
a set of descriptions, understood as the material available in the mind, does not 
suffice to produce all specifications necessary for the exact determination of a 
particular object. Take the case of visual perception, understood here as a way of 
supplying resources for determining objects. How can a poor visual experience, in 
precarious conditions (insufficient light, distant or tiny objects), individuate particular 
objects? And how can we distinguish an object in our world from its replica in Twin 
Earth?   
 Searle (1983) claimed that Kripke (1980) barks at the wrong tree, since he 
fails to comprehend the mind’s capacity of directing itself to particulars, which is 
anchored in relevant features of the particular experience itself. Such features can be 
seen as “this particular experience”, or “the experience of that man”. Given Searle’s 
reply to Kripke, the relevant question becomes the following: “how is this to be made 
out to conform to the general ‘Fregean’ picture?” (MCDOWELL, 1998c, p. 263). 
According to Searle, the object that is immediately accessible to the mind is the 
experience itself, or the mind’s attention towards something. ‘This visual experience’, 
seen as a particular thing, would be ‘in the mind’, and, therefore, it would be 
accessible to the specifications of the object. Searle’s proposal, as stressed by 
McDowell (1998c), inherits the Russellian notion of acquaintance. The acquaintance 
relation turns possible the direct determination of objects of thought (or propositions) 
without the need of introducing the whole apparatus of the theory of descriptions. If 
Fregean particular senses work as definite descriptions, then, in the case of objects 
given by acquaintance, the Fregean notion of sense becomes simply useless. We 
need no specifications to pick out an object that is already immediately given to the 
mind. 
 McDowell (1998c) reveals that Searle shares the same deep 
misunderstanding or blindness that characterizes most interpretations of Frege. It is 
ignored that the way in which an object is presented to the mind matters to what a 
thought is. Sense and reference (Bedeutung) are dimensions of the meaningful 
character of something. Senses cannot be simply eliminated from meaningful 
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propositions, as well as their corresponding Bedeutungen. If one fails, both fail 
together. One can take “this visual experience of this man” as a mode of 
presentation of something. Having the right experience becomes then a necessary 
condition for presenting the right Bedeutung. In this case, perceptual modes of 
presentation depend upon the object’s existence. They are, consequently, de re, 
and, at the same time, they are also perfectly compatible with the Fregean 
framework. The particular term “this man” depends, in order to be thought, on a 
specific perceptual experience, otherwise it would fail to express or carry the right 
content to the thought. Any thought with elements of the same relevant kind is de re, 
and it is as Fregean as it can be. Regarding this element as a de re sense, however, 
does not oblige one to adopt any form of Russellian proposition with particular 
objects given by acquaintance. Such theories individuate contents by individuating 
objects, while the interpretation of Frege advocated here individuates de re modes of 
presentation. 
 As in Burge’s case, there are profound reasons that explain Searle’s 
blindness. Frege and Russell reacted to different problems, and most interpreters 
tended to read Frege as if he was answering Russell’s problems. This traditional 
misinterpretation situated the Fregean view among problems that are orthogonal to it. 
Different solutions to these problems can be perfectly accommodated within his 
framework. When Frege talked about singular senses, he intended to deal with the 
fine-grained character of mental contents. He seemed to have in mind the subtle 
cognitive distinctions related to such contents. Russell, on the other hand, in his 
theory of descriptions, aimed at making expressions meaningful even in the absence 
of the determined object. The two problems may seem intuitively connected, but they 
can be theoretically separated and treated differently. 
 What is needed is a theory capable of facing both challenges at once. It is 
granted here that both challenges are legitimate, but they are just distinct and not 
directly connected. Most difficulties in reaching an unproblematic understanding of de 
re thoughts is explained by the mixing of the two problems, or the understanding of 
one from the perspective of the other. In an important sense, Frege was indifferent to 
the problem of empty singular terms. And this indifference is, at the end, a virtue of 
his theory, since it can now be adapted to alternative solutions that fare better than 
Russell’s proposal.  
 Another way of understanding the blindness of Burge and Searle, or the very 
root of the problem being discussed here, is by focusing on the way in which an 
intentional treatment of mental content is confused with an internalist treatment. 
Searle’s conception of internalism is marked by the conviction that mental contents 
are “in the head”, or “in the mind”. Hence his claim that a brain in a vat can entertain 
the same thoughts that we can. This assumption clearly rules out the presence of de 
re elements in thought. 
 As a matter of fact, Searle begins with a legitimate insight, but its range is 
exaggerated. Since it is difficult to explain the individuation of objects in a purely 
descriptive way (as it was shown by Kripke’s remarks), Searle concludes that extra-
intentional elements, which are relative to context or to the causation of mental 
states, are needed in order to identify the right object. An externalist account along 
these lines, according to Searle, changes the relevant subject, since talking about the 
directness of thought to particular objects is the same as talking about aspects of the 
content of certain mental states. Getting out of the mind (or adopting an externalist 
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point of view, or situating the content outside the subject’s cognitive domain) is the 
same as talking about something else other than the contents of mental states. The 
boundary separating internal and external leads Searle, who looks for an account of 
intentional phenomena, to a confinement inside the internal. Otherwise, according to 
him, one would simply change the topic. 
 There is some true in the internalist insight of Searle. But his understanding of 
internal is, in an important sense, misleading. Being internal does not mean ‘being in 
the head’, but being part of the space of concepts, or being part of the repertoire from 
which thoughts are formed. Whatever is presented to the mind when an object is 
perceived, it does not have to be a messenger of the object to the mind. What our 
thoughts are about do not have to be in the mind in the sense of being out of the 
world. This spatial metaphor is deeply misleading. What conforms our thoughts does 
not have to be independent of the objects that we get in touch with. As pointed by 
McDowell (1998c, p.272), “one’s subjectivity is partly constituted by one’s point of 
view on the objects in one’s environment”. Accommodating de re thoughts does not 
mean eliminating our account from the intentional field. On the contrary, it means 
bringing the intentional back to its right place. 
 
VIII 
 I conclude this article highlighting the epistemological origin of the problems 
raised by Russell that influenced the standard interpretations of Frege. 
 Russell raised the following problem: it is unacceptable that we could be 
deceived by sentences that are apparently singular, but that in fact express no 
singular proposition, since there is no referred object, and, therefore, no proposition 
being expressed. This unacceptable situation led him to develop the theory of 
descriptions. Apparent singular sentences do not express singular propositions, but 
they are disguised definite descriptions, that can be expressed even in the absence 
of their objects. According to Russell, we can only express or entertain singular 
propositions when no delusion is possible concerning the existence of the referred 
object. Only sense-data, or objects immediately given to the mind by acquaintance, 
can be admitted as providing genuine singular terms. 
 Following McDowell, I then ask: why is such delusion so intolerable? Why 
can’t we accept that some sentences express singular propositions, while others only 
seem to do it, but in fact fail to do so? The intolerable aspect of the delusion comes 
from deep epistemological assumptions. It is assumed that a procedure is 
epistemically legitimate, in a given situation, only in so far as it never leads to 
illusions or mistakes. In this sense, epistemology seeks for infallibility. A procedure 
can only produce acquaintance with an object if it can never fail to do so. The 
infallibility assumption, however, is not only unacceptable, but disastrous to 
epistemology as a whole. We would never be in a position to know anything if we 
cannot accept any possibly fallible procedure. 
 If infallibility is granted, Russell has no problem to accept de re elements. As a 
matter of fact, re can make part of Russellian propositions, which are composed of 
predicates and the objects themselves. But the need of infallibility springs from a 
misunderstanding of the Fregean distinction between sense and reference 
(Bedeutung). The Fregean idea that thoughts are constituted by senses guarantees 
the explicative role of thoughts (and their contents) in the psychological realm, since 
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it makes possible that different rational cognitive attitudes can be held towards co-
extensional thoughts. Russell does not address this problem appropriately. And 
Frege, as opposed to Russell, can accommodate de re thoughts insofar as he rejects 
the infallibility requirement.  
 Why did Russell hold the infallibility principle? Among many reasons, Russell 
thought that abandoning it would lead to the paradoxical situation in which a subject 
could be mistaken about the contents of her own thoughts. It would be possible for a 
subject to believe that she entertains a particular thought when in fact there is 
nothing to be thought. 
 The deepest source of Russell’s view, as pointed by McDowell (1998b, p. 
236), is his holding of a Cartesian picture of the mind. According to this picture, mind 
is the internal space, where everything is transparent to the subject. If we admit 
singular propositions about external objects, the internal space loses its autonomy. 
Mind would become dependent on external conditions. This distinction between 
external and internal seems to motivate, still today, many positions concerning crucial 
philosophical issues. However, internal does not mean ‘inside’ the subject, but 
internal to the space of concepts. If we abandon the Cartesian picture, mind and 
world can finally be allowed to inhabit the same realm, and we will finally be allowed 
to connect thoughts to mundane objects without getting off our heads or changing the 
subject. The very understanding of de re thoughts depends on having a better 
understanding of the boundaries separating internal and external. 
 
 
*   *   * 
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